The danger of seeing the Middle East exclusively in 'religious' terms

Georges Corm

Lebanese economist and historian Georges Corm's latest book criticizes the essentialist and reductionist perceptions of the Arab and wider Muslim world held by my many Middle East of observers and policy-makers dealing with that region. In his Pour une Lecture Profane des Conflits, he reflects on the debilitating effects the 'Clash of Civilizations Thesis' has had as the ideological driving force behind the 'War on Terror'.

At present this is hindering an appropriate understanding of what is at stake since the seismic shifts that have changed the political landscape in the Arabic-speaking parts of the Muslim world, with regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the troubled state of affairs in Iraq, the protracted civil war in Syria, and lingering unrest in countries such as Bahrain.

Because of the way these conflicts are reported and approached by outsiders dealing with the recalibration of policy-making or mediation in ongoing conflicts, the pervading view is:

that even after revolutions that were initially inspired by secular issues, the countries of the Arab world cannot shake off religion as the dominant force in politics. With its excessive political energies, political Islam remains the dominant power factor in the region.

Former Finance Minister Corm's book proposes a different way of looking at developments in the Middle East at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century; turning the gaze away from the erroneous view that gives undue privilege to the religion factor.

In actual fact, he explains, the Arab world is concerned with very different issues: the just distribution of power and resources, a functioning state based on the rule of law and democratic participation. However, Corm elucidates, an adequate language has not yet been found for these concerns, or rather, it has not yet been able to make its voice heard over the dominant religious discourse.

Over the course of three or four decades, he writes, every significant political opposition in the Arab world has placed itself in the religious camp. That has left traces that cannot be erased from one day to the next.

Central to Corm's analysis is the destructive influence of reactionary Islamic ideologues fueled by Saudi oil money, who reject the in themselves laudable ideas that underlie the Enlightenment:

The motto "liberté, égalité, fraternité" (liberty, equality, fraternity) was once very closely observed when it came to distributing power and wealth. Who gets what, and in whose favour do the distribution mechanisms work? It is not long ago, writes Corm, that questions like these were a fundamental part of every political science degree in the West, but that is no longer the case.

Instead, these have been replaced by a focus on culture, a factor that underlies both Huntington's new model of global order and the in Corm's equally mistaken foregrounding of multiculturalism, which has attained the status of ideology, but which is also  'discreetly similar to religious fundamentalism'. According to one reviewer:

Corm's culture-based interpretation of the Western perception of the conflicts currently permeating the Near East is fascinating. The only question is whether it still holds true. After all, many people in the West have indeed learned to take a closer look, to take the demands of the first protesters seriously and at face value.

Many now also share Corm's assessment that Arab secularism has sacrificed its own good reputation. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Assad Senior and Junior in Syria – all of them built up dictatorial regimes that trampled their citizens' rights underfoot and unleashed their secret services on all those who dared to question their rule and demand reform. And where words like democracy and the rule of law have not only lost all value but even have to serve as excuses for the crimes of allegedly progressive regimes, promising political ideals are turned on their heads.

Western observers and policy-makers should stop hiding the cynicism of their decades-long support for Arab autocrats  behind a facade of supposedly culturally sensitive explanations and boldly promote the reappreciation of democratic and humanitarian principles because of their normative validity.

To read the full article click here.

Below is a clip of a lengthy discussion with Corm on the situation in the Middle East:

French-Tunisian intellectual Abdelwahab Meddeb: Islamists are not ready for Democracy

In an interview with the Qantara website, the Paris-based Tunisian writer and commentator Abdelwahab Meddeb expresses his doubts regarding the future trajectories of his home country and Egypt under the governance of Islamic parties. Ever the critical observer he minces no words

The Islamists who are now in power did not take part in the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. Indeed the very fact that no religious slogans whatsoever were chanted during the revolution is in itself interesting. For this reason, it is safe to say that the election of the Islamists to government and their appearance on the political stage constitutes a kind of hijacking of the revolution.

For me, the Islamists have nothing to do with the Islamic tradition of the Middle Ages. After all, the text-based tradition of the Islamic Middle Ages was complex and ambiguous. It was based on controversy and the plurality of thought. Above all, however, it was part of a universal, historical theocentric age. In this age, God was at the centre of all societies.

Abdelwahab Meddeb

To his mind their reactionary attitude is out of sync with the present-day situation in the Muslim world:

 When attempts are made today to put God back at the centre of society instead of humankind, then for me, that is an enormous step backwards. Islamism has changed from being a religious tradition into an ideology. As a religion, Islam has – just like all religions – a global vision. In other words, they want to assert their influence in all areas.

Referring to Turkey, he still harbours reservations whether the Muslim world is really entering a post-Islamist era: 

Whether Erdogan's Islamism has really developed into an Islamic democracy will only become clear on the day that change occurs. So far, Erdogan has not been voted out of office. I am waiting for the day when he loses an election and I will watch with interest to see how he leaves office and returns to his own home. I don't think that the Islamists are ready for a democratic culture. I will believe in an Islamic democracy when I see this change actually taking place in the form of a democratic handover of power. In other words, change will be the ultimate proof.

 However, he is also cautiously optimistic about the chances of a change of course into an alternative direction:

At present, there is an open debate between secularists and Islamists in Tunisia. This is the first time that this has ever happened. Indeed, I think that people have long since forgotten the culture of listening to each other. We are currently in a period of transition. The period that follows will be critical.

Read the full interview by clicking here

The Muslim World in 2011: Another landmark Event

Mark Juergensmeyer's article, published by the Religion Dispatches website, carrying his first commentary on the death of Osama bin Laden and its impact on the future of radical Islamism and Muslim political extremism reiterates the point he made in an earlier essay on the impact of Egypt's 25 February 2011 Revolt and other uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa: That the war on terrorism was not won by US special forces or high-tech intelligence operations, but tweeting youths in the Arab world and elsewhere. It confirms the underpinnings of the Critical Muslims blog that -- in the long run -- the ideas of progressive, cosmopolitan and liberal-minded Muslims will outlast the nihilism of Islamist agendas. Here are a few excerpts corroborating this position:

Osama bin Laden 1957-2011

The imagined war of the Bush era may indeed be over. And the jihadi insurrection associated with bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization may also be dead. But I suspect that the real perpetrators of their deaths may not have been the elite American military cadre some hours ago in Pakistan, but the legion of cell-phone toting protestors earlier this year in Tahrir Square. They have helped to complete the erosion of legitimacy that has undermined the jihadi activists in recent years within the Muslim world. 

  What brought down the tyrants in Egypt and Tunisia, as it turned out, was about as far from jihad as one could imagine. It was a series of massive nonviolent movements of largely middle class and relatively young professionals who organized their protests through Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of electronic social networking.

  The religiosity of Tahrir Square is far from the religion of radical jihad. Rather than separating Muslim from non-Muslim, and Sunni from Shi'a, the symbols that were raised on impromptu placards in Tahrir Square were emblems of interfaith cooperation; they showed the cross of Coptic Christians together with the crescent of Egypt's Muslims in a united religious front against autocracy.

Tahrir Square is a profound anti-jihadi lesson, and its significance has spread around the world. It has ignited similar nonviolent protests elsewhere in the Middle East, and it may also have altered the thinking of activists in other cultures as well. Intense discussion is underway in Palestine, where the Hamas-dominated strategy of strategic violence has been largely counterproductive; will a new nonviolent and non-extremist movement of young educated Palestinian professionals create a different kind of impetus for change in their region of the Middle East?

 Read the entire essay by clicking here.

Mark Juergensmeyer

The above assessment echoes his earlier observations on the Tahrir Square phenomenon in the Huffington Post:

What brought down Mubarak, as it turned out, was about as far from jihad as one could imagine. It was a massive nonviolent movement of largely middle class and relatively young professionals who organized their mass protests through Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of electronic social networking. No doubt the passivity of the Egyptian military was also a critical factor; the army did not forcibly resist the protests, as the military has in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Yet one cannot underestimate the importance of Tahrir Square, and similar protests in Alexandria and throughout Egypt. Clearly, they constituted the catalyst for change. The rallies at Tahrir Square often seemed more like rock concerts than like urban warfare, and when fighting did break out it was largely promulgated by thugs hired by the Mubarak regime rather than the anti-government protestors. Perhaps not since the peaceful overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines has the world seen such a dramatic demonstration of the power of nonviolent resistance. The protests were not the weapons of jihad, nor were the voices of opposition the strident language of Islamist extremism.

Cairo's Tahrir Square, 25 February 2011

Here are his musings on Bin Laden's reaction to recent events in the Arab World -- not that these conjectures matter anymore:

Imagine what Osama bin Laden must have made of all of this as news trickled into the cave or cellar or whatever lair in which he is hiding. Imagine even more the puzzled chagrin of someone like bin Laden's primary lieutenant, Zawahiri, the Egyptian medical doctor who joined the most extreme Islamist jihadi movement years ago, convinced that only violent guerrilla warfare would topple someone like Mubarak. Tahrir Square clearly showed that Zawahiri was wrong. 

 However, he also added a cautionary caveat:

Does this mean that al Qaeda is finished, and the radical struggles of jihad will fizzle into history?Perhaps, in part. It is unlikely, however, that the al Qaeda organization, such as it is, will be abandoned. The small group of people who comprise the inner circle of the bin Laden organization will no doubt harden its resolve. Like the followers of millennarian movements who become more extreme and entrenched in their beliefs when the prophecized end of the world does not terminate on schedule, the true believers of al Qaeda will soldier on. (The whole essay can be found here).

In today's commentary he repeated that warning:

 The rise of a new nonviolent popularism in the Middle East may seriously undercut the viability of the jihadi image of violent social change. On the other hand, a significant number of failures of nonviolent resistence may lead to a violent backlash once again.

Indeed, we are not there yet...Specialists in religiously inspired violence such as Juergensmeyer will have their work cut out for  many years to come, but so will the analysts of the alternative discourses on the other side of the spectrum. 2011 may very well enter history as the watershed year for the amplification of those other voices.

For some of Juergensmeyer's books, click on the images below:

After Mubarak: Assessing the 'Islam Factor' in Egypt

In times of uncertainty 'imagination is more important than knowledge', Albert Einstein once said. Imagination is exactly what both political policy makers and pundits appear to lack when asked about their projections for Egypt's future. Pragmatists and advocates of maintaining some sort of a status quo, which will not shake the current power configurations within Egypt and in the Middle East too much,  can only see another military strong man taking over. The other -- and, to their taste, unpalatable -- alternative is an Islamist take-over by the Muslim Brotherhood, the subsequent foundation of an Islamic state, and the introduction of Sharia law....

This view seems particularly prevalent in American political circles, where, in a recent interview, former presidential candidate Senator John McCain demonstrated how entrenched the opinions and positions of the policy-making elite are. When asked if he could envisage the Muslim Brotherhood becoming a partner in negotiating a new political order for Egypt, McCain  categorically rejected that possibility, stating that the Muslim Brotherhood supports terrorism (questionable), has connections with Hamas (not untrue), and will introduce Sharia Law (not at all clear what that means), which is, according to McCain, per definition undemocratic. Confronted with the question that area specialists regard the Muslim Brotherhood as representing a broad spectrum of political views and not a monolithic bloc, and that politicians associated with organization can command the support of about one fifth of the electorate, he said that he still refuses to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood and that he does not give a hoot about expert opinions or votes cast for an organization he does not like. Such lack of appreciation of the  complexities of the political playing fields in non-Western cultures is only too often encountered in political power circles in Washington, London, and elsewhere. Now, given its high degree of organization and after decades of patiently infiltrating professional organizations and other parts of civil society, the Muslim Brotherhood simple cannot be ignored or sidelined.

As for the pro-democracy protesters currently holed up on Tahrir Square: In spite of the posturing of its spokespersons (more likely self-appointed than able to demonstrate a sizeable constituency) as unadulterated secularists, it is difficult to gauge what exactly is their common ground -- apart from ousting Mubarak. The big unknown is how much critical mass the alternative political ambitions harboured by the urban middle classes who are now in Tahrir Square will be able to muster and bring together.

So what are the alternatives to unabashed Islamist and secular agendas? For an indication of where to look, it is interesting to note that Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan was included in the list of four world leaders President Obama consulted by telephone before making his statement on 1 February. Taking Turkey into consideration makes not only sense because it is the most populous Muslim country in the Mediterranean and Middle East region, there are other reasons too.

Like Egypt, Turkey has a military with a high political profile. Since the 1920s it has presented itself as the defender of the constitution and frequently intervened in the political process when developments took a direction its leadership did not like. Unlike Egypt, Turkey has allowed experiments with Islamist politics and reconnoitered the boundaries of the tolerable and acceptable. That is why, in 1997, the army decided to oust the coalition government led by the Islamist Welfare Party in a 'velvet coup'. Subsequently part of its constituency reinvented itself as the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won the 2002 elections and has managed to stay in power through a policy focusing on economic development, democratic reforms, and religiously-inspired social conservatism rather than an active agenda of implementing what are regarded as the conventional elements of Islamism

AKP policy is reminiscent of Turkey’s Motherland Party, led by Turgut Özal in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the wake of the 1980 coup, this technocrat formulated what came to be known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), tacitly condoned and at times more explicitly acknowledged by the military strong man at the time, General Kenan Evran (see also the post of 8 May 2010). Its combination of a liberal economic course combined with social conservatism -- expanded by the AKP with bolder democratic reforms -- has shown itself to be remarkably resilient. It is a delicate balance to strike, but, by all appearances, it seems to go down well with large segments of Turkish society. While the core of AKP support lies with an enterpreneurial class mainly based in the towns of Anatolia, its majority betrays a broader constituency of urban middle classes of whom it is by no means certain they would remain loyal if more religiously-coloured policies are introduced, such as curtailing the consumption of alcohol (cf also post of 31 July 2010). 

Outside of the immediate political realm, the AKP's success also relies on the influence of the Gülen Movement. This amorphous phenomenon with no apparent hierarchical structure has managed to penetrate Turkish society with an aggregate of media conglomerates, think tanks, and -- most importantly – a network of schools and universities. Also beyond its cohort of mostly volunteer activists, it is appreciated for the excellent education it provides, its charity efforts and initiatives in the domain of community cohesion, both inside Turkey and abroad.

Some, and they include prominent political scientists, would argue that Turkey is an  exceptional case. I beg to differ. Because very similar developments have taken place in Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation-state in the world and a country that is culturally very different from Turkey and which has its own political history. Yet, there are some striking parallels. Although Indonesia’s constitution is not as staunchly secular as Turkey’s, political Islam has been kept at arm’s length by avoiding any explicit reference to Islam in the constitution, while its military apparatus too has always assumed an active political role. Since independence in 1945, successive regimes have frustrated the attempts of Islamist parties to make Islamic law applicable to its Muslim citizens. At the same time, the military regime led by General Soeharto, which ruled the country with iron fist for thirty years, was accommodative to the development of what has alternately been called civil, cultural or cosmopolitan Islam.

This was largely developed through two of the world’s largest Muslim mass organizations,  one representing Islamic modernists (the Muhammadiyah), the other the more traditionalist Muslims (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU, for short). Both were founded during colonial times and each claims to have more than 30 million followers (thereby dwarving the Muslim Brotherhood in numerical terms). After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, both the NU and Muhammadiyah rallied behind political parties supportive of the country's democratization process, while more radical Islamist parties only gained a small percentage of the votes, or did not make the electoral threshold at all. Although some concessions were made through the devolution of power to provincial authorities, which were then used locally to introduce elements of Islamic law in Islamist strongholds, the central government remains committed to internal democratization and economic development. On the international stage, the incumbent president, retired general Susono Bambang Yudhoyono, has positioned Indonesia as a bridge country connecting the Muslim world to rest of Asia and the world at large.

If this is possible in two sizeable and culturally such diverse Muslim countries as Turkey and Indonesia, it becomes more difficult to maintain that these are merely coincidental exceptions. Of course, Egypt’s history is different; Muslim organizations have not had the maneuvering space they were given in Turkey or Indonesia. Therefore, the big question to be answered is: has or can the Muslim Brotherhood transform itself into a civil society force instead of positioning itself as political party with an overt Islamist agenda? The outcome of the present political crisis in Egypt has not just massive impact on power configurations in the Middle East but also for the tectonic shifts which will take place in the world order in the coming decade. Jakarta and Ankara are already jockying for position, what will Cairo do?

Who can speak for or against Islam?

The New Yorker of 6 June 2010 carries an article by Pankaj Mishra, an Indian essayist and novelist, in which he critically assesses the influence of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Paul Berman, and Tariq Ramadan -- three individuals featuring prominently in recent debates of the place of Islam in Western societies and the role of religion in Muslim societies.

Here are some excerpts:

Muslims today, Hirsi Ali believes, must be forced to choose between the darkness of Islam and the light of the modern secular West. In her new book, which bears the additional subtitle “A Personal Journey Through the Clash of Civilizations,” she takes an uncompromising line with her own relatives, who remain faithful to their benighted religion. [...]

If Hirsi Ali’s rhetoric has earned her critics among Western liberals, she has a fierce defender in Paul Berman, whose new polemic, “The Flight of the Intellectuals” (Melville House; $26), hails her as a “classic example of a persecuted dissident intellectual.” He upbraids such writers as the Anglo-Dutch journalist Ian Buruma and the British academic Timothy Garton Ash, who, he says, “sneered at Ayaan Hirsi Ali for having taken up the ideas of Western liberalism.” Berman also condemns Buruma and Garton Ash for “grovelling” to Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss-born Muslim professor at Oxford University, whose work seeks to integrate observant Muslims into secular Western societies, and whom Berman sees as an apologist for extremism. For Berman, the spectacle of writers attacking Hirsi Ali while embracing Ramadan points to a dangerous “ reactionary turn in the intellectual world” of Europe and America.

 Ramadan, a prolific author who has preached a “European” Islam in the heart of secular France, has certainly attracted the attention of journalists and academics, along with those uncompromising secularists who use him as a foil [...] Sooner or later, just about every writer of non-Western background finds himself taken to be a representative of, or spokesperson for, his community, nation, race, or religion. Ramadan, who has solemnly, even pompously, embraced this role, seems no more than one of the many academics struggling to fulfill the West’s post-9/11 demand for “moderate” Islam.

Read the whole article here